The U.S. Supreme Court is neither democratic nor easily changed, to some Americans’ delight and others’ dismay. No one would seriously propose that we elect Justices—just take a look at the tawdry contests in states that put their supreme courts and various judicial posts on the ballot. But is the third federal branch so perfect that it is immune from reform?
This question is worth asking again since we are facing yet another Court confirmation battle. Justice John Paul Stevens is retiring at the age of 90 after 35 years on the Court, a simple fact that in itself encapsulates the static nature of the institution.
The American public just might be ready to consider a judicial reform or two. While the Supreme Court’s approval level in most recent surveys is in the 50s, citizens are not inclined to view the Court as positively as they once did. Conservatives still remember the liberal Warren Court and many unpleasant (to them) decisions since, not least Roe v. Wade, while liberals harrumph when they recall Bush v. Gore in 2000 or, more recently, the Citizens United decision that some say will open the floodgates even more for corporate money in the election process.
For starters, what about abolishing lifetime tenure of Supreme Court Justices (and maybe lower federal court judges) and moving toward a nonrenewable fixed term of 15 to 18 years? One could argue that the Constitution doesn’t guarantee lifetime tenure anyway, saying only that Justices shall serve “during good Behaviour.” When Justices stay on the Supreme Court for decades—well into their 70s, 80s, and beyond—they often become insular and out of touch with new mores, advanced technologies, and younger generations. Structured properly, staggered appointments of fixed-term seats would also insure that each new president, reflecting the mandate of his or her election, would get an appointment or two.
Given judicial salaries that are low compared to the private sector, perhaps additional highly qualified individuals would be willing to serve in term-limited judicial posts. Chief Justice John Roberts favored a term limit before he was nominated to the Court—and a sizeable number of legal scholars have also endorsed this reform. As it is, presidents are overlooking many of the ablest and most experienced legal minds, preferring to seek out young, less veteran attorneys so that they can leave a long-lasting legacy on the Court.
Absent a term limit, which would be my preference, the nation might want to consider a generous mandatory retirement age. John Paul Stevens seems vigorous enough, but Court scholars well remember Stevens’ predecessor, William O. Douglas, who had been incapacitated by a stroke and was infirm at age 77, yet fought to stay on the Court anyway.
Inevitably, these reforms will have political consequences, although they are not immediately predictable. So what? The political nature of the Court has been on display at the confirmation hearings of every recent appointee, and even at the 2010 State of the Union address. In an extraordinary precedent that went well beyond FDR’s criticism of the Court in the 1930s, President Obama sharply rebuked the Court for its Citizens United ruling, while Democratic congressmen stood and cheered. Justice Sam Alito, appointed by President Bush, could be seen to shake his head and mouth the words “not true”. This was the latest proof that the Court is naturally political—and that it does not reside on Mount Olympus, in the view of many citizens in and out of public life.
The most recent public opinion survey about the Court, conducted by Fairleigh Dickinson University in January and February 2010, confirms the public’s evolving views and desire for a more open and accessible Court. By a margin of 61% to 26%, respondents said that “televising Supreme Court hearings would be good for democracy, rather than undermining the [Court’s] dignity or authority.” Democrats, Republicans, and Independents were in agreement—a rarity in this polarized era.
More remarkably, Americans of all partisan stripes endorsed “limiting any Supreme Court Justice to a maximum term of 18 years on the bench.” Overall, respondents favored this proposal by a margin of 56% to 35%. (The telephone survey included a random sample of 1,002 registered voters, with a margin of error of 3%.)
The people of the United States have come to accept a large role for the judicial branch, despite its undemocratic nature. But the inherent distrust of concentrated, seemingly unlimited power has also given many Americans pause. Under the right set of circumstances, and despite the enormous difficulties involved in changing the Constitution, a constitutional amendment to restructure the Court might receive serious consideration.
This essay has been prepared for publication by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.