KEY POINTS FROM THIS ARTICLE
— While the state of the economy was likely an important factor in the 2024 presidential election and other recent contests, discontent over economic conditions doesn’t really explain the movement of white working class voters to the Republican Party in the longer-term.
— Rather, ideological realignment was probably a larger driver of white working class voters, once the base of the Democratic Party decades ago, into the Republican column.
Racial and cultural issues better explain GOP dominance with white working class
The rise of Republican identification and voting among white working class citizens has been one of the most important developments in American electoral politics over the past half century. During the New Deal era of American politics, white voters without a college degree comprised the electoral base of the Democratic Party, regularly providing huge majorities for Democratic candidates up and down the ballot. It was the overwhelming support of white working class voters that enabled Democrats to dominate elections at the state, national, and local level during the 1930s and 1940s. Even after Dwight Eisenhower broke the Democratic lock on the White House in 1952, white working class votes allowed Democrats to dominate Congress and most state governments from the 1950s through the 1970s.
Today the white working class comprises the electoral base of the Republican Party, consistently providing solid majorities for GOP candidates up and down the ballot. That support reached record heights in the last three presidential elections in which Donald Trump was the Republican presidential nominee. According to network exit polls, Trump won 66%, 67%, and 66% of the vote among whites without a college degree in the 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections. In the same three elections, Trump won only 48%, 48%, and 45% of the vote among white college graduates according to the exit polls.
These results represent a complete inversion of the traditional class voting patterns that existed from the 1930s through the 1970s. During those years, white college graduates were a reliably Republican voting bloc. As recently as 1976, according to data from the American National Election Studies, white college graduates favored Republican Gerald Ford over Democrat Jimmy Carter by a margin of 63% to 37% while non-college whites favored Ford by a much narrower margin of 51% to 49%.
The dramatic shift in the partisan alignment of white working class voters over the past several decades, and especially the overwhelming support of this voting bloc for Donald Trump, has led to considerable speculation about the reasons for the rise of white working class Republicanism. Much of this speculation has focused on changes in the U.S. economy that have had a detrimental impact on the economic security and standard of living of this group. Since the 1970s, according to this theory, the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. as a result of automation and competition from low-wage countries like China and Mexico has devastated many working class communities and led to growing disillusionment with the Democratic Party, whose leaders were seen as complicit in these changes. Donald Trump, with his focus on the grievances of those who felt left behind by changes in American society, was especially effective in appealing to these disillusioned white working class voters.
In this article, I examine the rise of white working class Republicanism in American politics. Contrary to much of the conventional wisdom, I argue that economic discontent has very little to do with this phenomenon. Instead, I argue that the growing attraction of white working class voters to the Republican Party is a result of the ideological realignment of the political parties over the past 50 years. The growing divide between the Democratic and Republican parties over economic, racial, and cultural issues has led to an ideological realignment within the electorate. Groups with relatively conservative policy preferences, including white voters without college degrees, have shifted their allegiances to the Republican Party while groups with relatively liberal policy preferences, including white college graduates, have shifted their allegiances to the Democratic Party. These findings have important implications for the future of electoral competition and for party strategies.
Explaining the rise of white working class Republicanism
The movement of white working class voters to the Republican Party began long before Donald Trump’s entry into electoral politics in 2015. Figure 1, based on data from American National Election Studies surveys conducted between 1952 and 2020, shows that the share of white working class voters identifying with or leaning toward the GOP has grown steadily, rising from 33% at the time of Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976 to 55% during Donald Trump’s first two elections in 2016-2020.[1] During most of this time period, the percentage of white college graduates identifying with or leaning toward the Republican Party remained fairly stable, ranging between 48% and 54%. Since 2012, however, Republican identification among college-educated white college graduates fell from 52% to 45%. During the 2016-2020 timeframe, for the first time in this entire time series, Republican identification among white voters without a college degree exceeded Republican identification among white college graduates.
Figure 1: Percentage identifying or leaning Republican among college and non-college white voters by presidential era
Note: Elections are divided into nine presidential eras here and in subsequent figures: The Eisenhower era (1952-56), the Kennedy-Johnson era (1960-1964), the Nixon-Ford era (1968-1972), the Carter era (1976), the Reagan-Bush 1 era (1980-1988), the Clinton era (1992-1996), the Bush 2 era (2000-2004), the Obama era (2008-2012), and the Trump era (2016-2020).
Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative File
The fact that Republican identification among white working class voters has been growing for decades, during good times and bad, and during Republican and Democratic administrations in Washington, suggests that it is not affected by short-term changes in economic conditions. Still, it is possible that this trend reflects a long-term decline in the economic fortunes of white working class citizens in response to the loss of manufacturing jobs and declining incomes of blue-collar workers. To test this hypothesis, we can first examine how white working class voters have fared in terms of their economic well-being compared with other Americans over the past few decades. Figure 2 displays the trends in average family income level of white working class citizens, white college graduates, nonwhite working class citizens, and nonwhite college graduates between the Eisenhower era and the Trump era. Income levels here are measured by percentile groupings: 0-16th percentile (1), 17th to 33rd percentile (2), 34th to 67th percentile (3), 68th to 95th percentile (4), and 96th to 100th percentile (5).
Figure 2: Trend in average family income percentile by education and race
Source: ANES Cumulative File
The data displayed in this figure do not support the claim that white-working class Americans have experienced a decline in their relative standard of living over the past several decades. In fact, the data show that the relative income level of this group has changed very little. On our 1-5 scale, the mean score of non-college white voters was 2.8 during the Eisenhower era, 2.9 during the Kennedy-Johnson era, 2.8 during the Nixon-Ford era, 2.9 during the Carter era, 2.8 during the Reagan-Bush 1 era, 2.8 during the Clinton era, 2.8 during the Bush 2 era, 2.8 during the Obama era, and 2.9 during the Trump era.
In terms of family income, the data in Figure 2 show that the white working class has consistently been slightly below the overall average and well below the average for both white college graduates and nonwhite college graduates but well above the average for nonwhite working class voters. However, the data show that the income gap between white and nonwhite working class voters has narrowed considerably over time due to dramatic gains in the relative incomes of nonwhite working class Americans. During the 1950s, the average income score for nonwhite working class citizens was a meager 1.8 compared with the average of 2.9 for white working class citizens. In the 2016-2020 period, in contrast, the average income score for nonwhite working class citizens was 2.6 compared with 2.9 for white working class citizens.
Figure 3: Percentage of non-college whites identifying or leaning Republican by family income category and presidential era
Source: ANES Cumulative File
Not only has the relative economic well-being of white working class Americans not declined over time, but within this group, relative economic well-being is unrelated to trends in partisan affiliation. Figure 3 displays trends in the percentage of Republican identifiers and leaners among white working class voters by relative income category. The data show that since the Carter presidential era, the percentage of Republican identifiers and leaners has increased substantially among all three income categories. In fact, the data show that those in the bottom third of the income distribution have trended Republican at a slightly slower rate than those in the middle and upper thirds of the distribution. Moreover, among white working class Americans, Republican affiliation has generally been highest among those who are the most financially secure and lowest among those who are the least financially secure.
Table 1: Leaned party identification among non-college white voters in Trump era by family income percentile
Source: ANES Cumulative File
The evidence we have examined thus far does not support the argument that growing economic insecurity has driven white working class voters to abandon their traditional loyalty to the Democratic Party and embrace the GOP. Table 1 presents additional evidence about the economic insecurity hypothesis by focusing on the relationship between family income percentile and leaned party identification during the most recent presidential era. The data show that during the Trump era, there was actually a negative relationship between economic insecurity and Republican identification among white working class Americans. By far, the highest level of Republican identification, 74%, was found among the most affluent non-college educated white working class voters, those with incomes above the 95th percentile for the population, while the lowest level of Republican identification, 42%, was found among the most economically insecure white working class voters, those with incomes below the 17th percentile for the population.
An alternative explanation for the rise of white working class Republicanism focuses on the impact of ideological realignment and polarization. Over the past several decades, the Democratic and Republican parties have moved further and further apart on a wide range of issues. Conservative Democrats, once a substantial force within the Democratic Party, especially within its large southern wing, have died off or become Republicans. Meanwhile, moderate-to-liberal Republicans have largely disappeared through a combination of attrition or conversion. This process has been most evident at the elite level but it has also clearly affected the electorate, as the Pew Research Center and others have documented.
While the Democratic and Republican parties continue to differ on traditional economic issues involving the size and role of government, the past few decades have been marked by a growing divide over racial and cultural issues including voting rights, criminal justice, abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and, more recently, immigration and transgender rights. According to the ideological realignment hypothesis, the rise of these newer issues has contributed to a realignment within the electorate as voters with more conservative views, including many working class whites, have moved to the right and shifted their partisan allegiance to the GOP while voters with more liberal views, including many college-educated whites, have moved to the left and shifted their partisan allegiance to the Democrats.
Figure 4: Percentage of non-college whites identifying or leaning Republican by ideology and presidential era
Source: ANES Cumulative File
Data from American National Election Studies surveys show clear evidence of this ideological realignment among white working class voters. Between the Nixon-Ford era and the Trump era, the percentage of working class whites identifying as conservative grew from 26% to 41%. Meanwhile, as the data in Figure 4 show, the percentage of conservatives identifying with the Republican Party grew from less than 60% to over 90%. Almost all of the increase in Republican identification among working class white voters was concentrated among self-identified conservatives. Republican identification increased only slightly among those identifying as moderate or without a clear ideological identification while falling substantially among the relatively small group of self-identified liberals.
Figure 5: Distributions of college and non-college white voters on liberal-conservative policy scale in 2020
Source: 2020 ANES
These findings indicate that ideology, not economic discontent, has been the main driver of partisan realignment among white working class voters in the United States. The main reason that working class whites are now much more likely to identify with the Republican Party than college educated whites is that they are much more conservative across a wide range of issues. Further evidence of this ideological divide can be seen in Figure 5, which displays the distributions of white working class and white college-educated voters on a liberal-conservative policy scale in 2020. This scale is based on a variety of issues including racial issues, abortion, environmental issues, gun control, and immigration along with liberal-conservative self-identification. The data in this figure show that white working class voters were far more conservative than white college-educated voters. About two-thirds of working class whites scored above average on this conservatism scale compared with just over 40% of white college graduates.
Figure 6: Percentage of non-college and college educated whites voting for Trump by location on liberal-conservative policy scale
Source: 2020 ANES
The data displayed in Figure 6 show that location on this liberal-conservative policy scale was a powerful predictor of vote choice for both college-educated and non-college educated whites. Only 7% of white working class voters located to the left of center (-3 through -1) on the scale voted for Donald Trump compared with 92% of those located to the right of center (1 through 3). Similarly, only 3% of white college graduates located to the left of center voted for Trump compared with 91% of those located to the right of center. Overall, 65% of working class whites in the ANES sample voted for Trump compared with only 42% of college educated whites. However, at each position on the scale, the percentage of working class and college educated whites voting for Trump was almost identical. The difference between the candidate preference of working class and college educated whites is almost completely explained by the greater conservatism of working class white voters.
The white working class and the 2024 presidential election
White working class voters continued to support Donald Trump and other Republican candidates by overwhelming margins in the 2024 election. In the presidential election, according to the 2024 national exit poll, non-college white voters favored Trump over Democratic nominee Kamala Harris 66% to 32%. In contrast, white college graduates favored Harris over Trump 53% to 45%. The 21-point class divide in support for Trump was similar in size to the class divide in Trump’s two previous presidential runs.
Because data from the full 2024 ANES cross-sectional survey was not yet available, I used data from the 2024 ANES Pilot Study, which was conducted between Feb. 20 and March 1 of 2024, to examine the forces influencing presidential candidate preference early in the election year. At that time, of course, Joe Biden was still expected to be the Democratic nominee. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of non-college whites in this sample indicated a preference for Donald Trump over Joe Biden compared with 40% of college educated whites.
Table 2: 2024 presidential voting intention by family income and economic ladder rating among non-college whites
Source: ANES 2024 Pilot Study
The evidence we have examined thus far indicates that ideology rather than economic discontent has been the main factor driving the rise of white working class Republicanism. I examined the impact of economic discontent on support for Donald Trump in the 2024 election by using two variables from the 2024 ANES Pilot Study—a family income scale and an economic ladder question asking respondents to compare their own economic experiences with those of their parents. The data displayed in Table 2 show that neither question was clearly related to support for Trump: 62% of working class whites with family incomes of less than $60,000 favored Trump over Biden compared with 67% of those with family incomes of $60,000 or more. Likewise, economic ladder ratings had no relationship with presidential candidate preference. Those who perceived themselves having a harder time getting ahead than their parents were slightly less likely to favor Trump than those who perceived themselves having an easier time getting ahead than their parents.
To examine the relative influence of ideology and economic discontent on presidential candidate preference among working class white voters, I conducted a logistic regression analysis with major party vote choice as the dependent variable.[2] Independent variables in the analysis were family income, economic ladder ratings, and a liberal-conservative policy scale similar to the one used in my analysis of vote choice in the 2020 presidential election. This scale includes items measuring preferences on abortion, immigration policy, transgender rights, racial resentment, and ideological identification. The results are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: Logistic regression analysis of 2024 presidential vote preference among non-college white voters
Source: ANES 2024 Pilot Study
The results in Table 3 show that neither measure of economic discontent had a significant effect on preference for Donald Trump over Joe Biden. In fact, the coefficient for the economic ladder variable is signed in the opposite direction. If anything, working class whites who perceived themselves as having a harder time getting ahead than their parents were slightly less likely to support Trump than those who perceived themselves having an easier time getting ahead than their parents. However, in contrast with both measures of economic discontent, the ideology scale has a powerful and highly significant impact on candidate preference. These results show that conservatism, not economic discontent, explained support for Donald Trump among working class white voters in 2024.
The incredible shrinking white working class and the future of the Democratic Party
In 2024, as in other recent elections, the large majority of white voters without a college degree supported Republican candidates from the top of the ballot down to the local level. I have argued, contrary to many other political observers, that the main explanation for the rise of white working class Republicanism is not economic discontent based on the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs due to outsourcing and automation. Rather, the main driver of white working class Republicanism is ideology. The large majority of white working class voters supported Donald Trump and other Republican candidates in 2024 because they agree with the conservative ideological position of Republicans on a wide range of issues.
The declining fortunes of Democratic candidates among white working class voters, a group that for many decades made up the largest part of the Democratic voter base, has led to a good deal of soul-searching among Democratic leaders and activists and to potential strategies for trying to increase the party’s fortunes among this group. These proposals often focus on policies to address the economic concerns of white working class voters by providing good-paying jobs for those without college degrees. Unfortunately for Democrats, however, the findings presented in this article suggest that such policies are unlikely to significantly increase the Democratic share of the vote among this group.
Despite the fact that white working class voters are unlikely to respond to Democratic efforts to appeal to their economic interests, there are a couple of reasons why Democrats need not despair about the party’s outlook for the future. One is that Democratic decline among white working class voters has been partially offset in recent years by improving Democratic performance among white college graduates, as the data in Figure 1 show. According to national exit polls, between 2016 and 2024, the Democratic share of the vote among white college graduates increased from 45% to 51% to 53% while the Republican share fell from 49% to 48% to 45%.
Figure 7: Racial and educational composition of U.S. electorate by presidential era
Source: ANES Cumulative File
The other cause for Democratic optimism about the future is that the proportion of the American electorate made up of white working class voters has been declining steadily since the 1950s, as the data displayed in Figure 7 show. During the Eisenhower era, working class whites made up over 80% of the electorate. Today, however, they make up only about 40% of the electorate. There is no reason to think that this trend will not continue for the foreseeable future. By 2032, non-college whites will probably comprise only about one third of the American electorate.
The main reason why Kamala Harris lost the 2024 presidential election and why Democrats lost control of the Senate and fell just short of taking back the House of Representatives in 2024 was not that they lost ground among white working class voters. In fact, exit polls showed that Democrats did as well or better than four years earlier with this group. The group that swung decisively toward the GOP in 2024 was not the white working class but nonwhite voters of all types. According to national exit polls, between 2016 and 2024, the Democratic share of vote fell from 71% to 70% to 65% among nonwhite college graduates and from 75% to 72% to 64% among nonwhites without a college degree.
The most plausible path for a Democratic comeback in the 2026 and 2028 elections is not through significant gains among white working class voters. It is more likely to be through a comeback among nonwhite voters with and without college degrees. That is because, according to data from recent American National Election Studies surveys, nonwhite voters, including nonwhite working class voters, hold much more liberal views on major policy issues than white working class voters. In 2020, for example, 62% of nonwhite working class voters and 67% of nonwhite college graduates were located to the left-of-center on the liberal-conservative policy scale.
Democratic losses among nonwhite voters in 2024 were likely a result of discontent with economic conditions among a segment of this group, especially those with lower levels of political engagement. This is a group that could be far easier to win back in 2026 and 2028, especially if the Trump administration and congressional Republicans fail to deliver on their promises of lower prices and better jobs.
Endnotes
[1] I use party identification rather than presidential vote choice as my measure of partisanship because it provides a more stable indicator of support for a party. Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, presidential vote choice often diverged from partisan identification with many voters crossing party lines. In more recent elections, however, the connection between party identification and vote choice has been much stronger and defections to the opposing party’s candidates are relatively rare.
[2] A small percentage of respondents who were undecided or preferred a minor party candidate were excluded from this analysis.
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Alan I. Abramowitz is the Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University and a senior columnist with Sabato’s Crystal Ball. His latest book, The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump, was released in 2018 by Yale University Press. |